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REPLY TO STATEMENT OF QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that
"[b]ased upon the undisputed facts of record and equities between
the parties, the court

concludes the doctrine

of

equitable

subrogation as claimed by defendant Security Pacific
applicable in this case."

(Opinion, page 2)

is not

The courts did not

change existing law that equitable subrogation may be applicable in
a proper fact situation.

It is simply not applicable in the fact

situation before the court.
The defendant had actual/or constructive notice of the
painting and remodeling work that appellee was performing for at
least nine days prior to the time the subject property was
refinanced.

The application of constructive notice is favored by

law in cases interpreting mechanic's lien laws.

Notice to the

appellants was only one of many factual reasons in this case that
would bar the application of the doctrine of equitable subrogation.
However, knowledge (actual or constructive) by the appellant of the
pending

work

would

have

been

sufficient

by

itself

to

bar

application of the doctrine of equitable subrogation in this
particular fact situation.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction arises from the decision of the Utah Court
of Appeals in the matter of J. LaMar Richards v. Security Pacific
National Bank, Case No. 920679-CA filed March 9, 1993, as reported
in 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 81 and is not disputed.
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APPLICABLE STATUTE
Utah Code Annotated, 38-1-5:
Priority - Over other encumbrances.
The liens herein provided for shall relate
back to, and take effect as of, the time of
the commencement to do work or furnish
materials on the ground for the structure or
improvement, and shall have priority over any
lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which may
have attached subsequently to the time when
the building, improvement or structure was
commenced, work begun, or first material
furnished on the ground; also over any lien,
mortgage or other encumbrance of which the
lien holder had no notice and which was
unrecorded at the time the building, structure
or improvement was commenced, work begun, or
first material furnished on the ground.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Appellee is a painting contractor who performed painting
services beginning before June 29, 1988, which were described in
his lien as "prepare, repair, prime and paint exterior of house and
garage." When the painting and repair services were not paid for,
a

lien was

filed

and

subsequently

a foreclosure

action was

commenced. Security Pacific was named in the suit as the successor
in interest to Ameristar Financial Corporation which had performed
the original financing.
In July

1988, the month

following

commencement

of

appellee's painting work, the subject property was conveyed to

<

Debra Youngman by Lafayette Properties (of which Youngman was an
officer) by a deed signed by Youngman's business associate Deborah
Diamanti.

On

the

same

day

Ameristar

Financial

2
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Corporation

i

consolidated several loans and encumbrances against the property
and refinanced the property for $320,000. During the refinancing,
the bank paid to Lafayette Properties $53,546.00.

Lafayette's

interest was unrecorded at the time the painting work commenced.
The amount of the encumbrances against the property was increased
over

the

combined

amounts

of

several

previously

existing

encumbrances. Prior to refinancing, the property was appraised by
the

financing

institutions

at

over

$500,000.

After

the

refinancing, defendant immediately defaulted on payments of the
loan and
property

foreclosure was commenced.
at the trust deed

Appellant acquired the

sale, receiving the benefits of

appellee's materials and painting services for itself.
The appellant bank defended the mechanic's lien action,
claiming that under the concept of equitable subrogation it should
be placed in the position of the various individuals or entities
whose loans it paid off when the house was refinanced after the
commencement of the painting work. The trial court found that the
facts and equities did not warrant application of the doctrine of
equitable subrogation and ruled in plaintiff's favor. The Court of
Appeals found that the doctrine of equitable subrogation should not
be applied in this fact situation and affirmed the decision of the
trial court.
Proceedings and Disposition Below
From cross motions for summary judgment, the Hon. Pat B.
Brian, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, found that the
doctrine of equitable subrogation is not applicable to the facts
3
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and equities of this case and ruled in plaintiff's favor.
court's order was entered on August 20, 1991.

The

Security Pacific

filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial
court's decision on March 9, 1993.
Response to Statement of Facts
The following Statements of Fact in appellant's Petition
are either inaccurate or misleading or not supported by the record.
Appellant's Statements of Fact #1 and #2 are misleading.
The date when the property was purchased by Debra Youngman is
uncertain.
1985,

Although the Uniform Real Estate Contract was dated

it was

not

recorded

appellee's painting work.

until

after

the

commencement

of

It was notarized in 1988 by an agent of

Youngman's corporation whose notary expired

in 1992.

It is

uncertain from the record whether the actual contract to purchase
the property from Youngman's corporation was executed prior to or
after the commencement of the painting work.

(Record, pages 112-

121)
Appellant's Statement of Fact #10 is misleading because
it suggests that defendant Youngman did not benefit from the loan
proceeds.

Youngman was an owner and executive officer of a

corporation
conveyed

known

as

Lafayette

Properties

(Lafayette)

which

the property to Youngman after the commencement of

appellee's work.

Lafayette received $53,546.00 from the closing.

<

The details of how Lafayette distributed the money to Youngman was
not an issue the trial court addressed.

(Record, p. 145)

Appellant's Statement of Fact #16 is misleading. At the
4
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(

time Mr. Richards began his work, the alleged contract whereby
Lafayette Sold the property to its owner/officer Debra Youngman was
not recorded and therefore was not a senior encumbrance to Mr.
Richards' lien. When the subject contract was actually signed is
questionable.

(Record, pp. 99, 101, 112, 121)

Appellant's
inferences.

Statement of Fact

#18 leaves

incorrect

The boiler plate small print of the bank form states

that borrower (Youngman) has not "...agreed to ... permit any lien
upon the property to secure a debt or loan." However, at the time
the document was filed no lien had been filed and the financing
institutions were either actually or constructively aware of the
painting work in progress. The record does not reveal whether the
financing institution had actual knowledge.

However, it is clear

that its client Youngman had actual notice.

(Record, pp. 214-215)

Appellant's Statements of Fact #19 and #20 describing
Ameristar's expectations are disputed and not supported by the
record.

There is no evidence showing what the "expectation of

Ameristar" may have been.

Ameristar did not answer the Complaint

and its default was entered.

The affidavit filed alleging what

Ameristar's expectations were was signed by a person who was not an
employee of Ameristar when the subject loan transaction occurred
and was not based on personal knowledge of the facts pertaining to
this incident.

(Record, pp. 172, 178, 205-209)

Appellant's Statement of Fact #21 is incomplete and
leaves incorrect inferences in describing the assignments from
Ameristar to appellant Security Pacific via another bank.
5
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The

assignments were not recorded for seven months after the purported
dates of their execution. Richards1 lien was recorded in November
1988, approximately six months before the assignments to the
appellant bank were recorded.

(Record, pp. 102-103, 201-202, 39-

40)
Appellant's

Statement

of

Fact

#23

is

misleading

concerning the resale price of the subject property.

The record

does not show a price for which appellant purchased the property at
the trust deed foreclosure or the price for which appellant re-sold
the property.

(Record, p. 248)

APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
1.

The Real Estate Contract between Debra Youngman and

Lafayette 'Properties was purportedly

dated

and

notarized by

defendant Youngman's business associate and defendant Diamanti.
The notary seal indicated that the notary commission expired on
March 14, 1992.

(Record, p. 121)

Presumably, the document was

signed during the 4 years prior to the expiration of the notary
seal.

The actual date of execution of the contract is therefore

not known, but the contract was not recorded until June 29, 1988,
after the commencement of plaintiff's work.

(Record, pp. 112, 99)

2. Richards commenced painting and remodeling work prior
to June 29, 1988, and completed his work August 30, 1988. A lien
was timely filed on November 16, 1988, for $5,499.50.

(Record pp.

3 6-40; 99, 'paragraph 6; 102; 302)
3.

In July 1988 Youngman refinanced the subject real

estate for $320,000 and paid off several prior encumbrances.
6
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The

financing institutions relied on an appraisal of the property of
over $500,000. (Record, pp. 208, 216, 223) The underwriter at the
time of closing identified the loan as one with "good ratios" and
"very low loan value."
4.

(Record, p. 216)

When the refinancing loan closed, the encumbrances

against the property were increased by $16,453.05, most of which
were paid to the financing institutions as fees for arranging the
refinancing.
5.

(Record, p. 218)
From the loan proceeds, $53,546.00 was paid to

defendant Youngman's corporation Lafayette Properties.
pp. 157, 174, 178)

(Record,

Borrower Youngman was an endorser with her

business associate Diamanti on the $53,546.00 check paid to
Lafayette Properties.1
6.

(Record, pp. 157, 178, 63)

At the time of the loan closing, a deed from

Lafayette

Properties to

Defendant

Diamanti

Youngman was

signed

the

deed

executed
on

behalf

and

recorded.

of

Lafayette

Properties'under authority of a purported power of attorney.

The

deed was recorded by U.S. Title Insurance Company at the very same
time as the other refinancing documents were recorded (July 7,
12:12 p.m.)

(Record, pp. 172, 187)

The deed and the real estate

contract between Lafayette and Youngman were both recorded after
Richards commenced his lienable work.

(Record, pp. 112, 99, 101,

39, 40)

1

Debra Youngman was vice president of Lafayette in 1985 and
was an endorser of the bank's check to Lafayette. She had a joint
personal business account with Diamanti as supported by the record.
(Record, pp. 63, 136-137, 157-158)
7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7.

The interest of Ameristar was assigned to First

Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. and then from First Boston to
Security Pacific National Bank. Both assignments are dated October
15, 1988, but were not recorded until May 10, 1989.

(Record, pp.

201-202)
ARGUMENT
Introduction
The

facts

and

equities

in this

case

do

not lend

themselves to application of the doctrine of equitable subrogation.
Appellee asserts there was no material misunderstanding by the
lower courts and, in any event, the issues appellant disputes would
have had no bearing on the decision of either the trial court or
the Court of Appeals. All facts must be considered and equity be
of overriding consideration before equity will relieve the clear
operation of law.

The Court of Appeals stated:

An
individual's
access
to
equitable
subrogation as a "remedy depends upon the
principles of justice, equity, and benevolence
to be applied to the facts of the particular
case." Hickenlooper, 59 P.2d at 1140.
The Court of Appeals found that in equitable subrogation cases,
"[t]he equitable nature of the doctrine prevents articulation of an
unwavering rule that applies in all cases."

(Opinion, p. 4)

A

footnote to the opinion in the case at bar is very expressive on
the fact sensitivity of this type of case.
Furthermore, this case illustrates the
wasteful nature of litigation over the
doctrine
of
equitable
subrogation.
Plaintiff's five thousand dollar lien has most
recently been the subject of a judgment,
8
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including costs and fees, of nearly ten
thousand dollars. That does not include the
costs or fees relating to this appeal, which
plaintiff also recovers.
The nature of
situations in which equitable remedies are
applicable are highly fact sensitive and will
always require a significant amount of legal
work to present.
Thus, encouraging simple
contractual solutions is sound public policy.
(Opinion, p. 9)
The

court

also

found

that

between

commercially

sophisticated lenders and mechanics' materialmen, the legislature
favored the statutory protection given to mechanic's lien holders
based on constructive or actual notice. The Court of Appeals found
as the trial court did that "[b]ased on the undisputed facts of
record and equities between the parties, the court concludes that
the doctripe of equitable subrogation as claimed by defendant
Security Pacific is not applicable in this case." (Opinion, pp. 23)

The court held that Security Pacific's interest was inferior

and subordinate to appellee's mechanic's lien.
Point I
The Application of Constructive and/or
Actual Notice was Properly Interpreted by
the Court of Appeals
In appropriate circumstances constructive notice will
defeat application of equitable subrogation. The Court of Appeals
is not enumerating an unwaverable rule of constructive notice.
Equity cases by their very nature must be evaluated on their
uniquely different fact situations. In this case the constructive
notice of outside painting work beginning over 9 days prior to
refinancing was found to be sufficient basis to sustain the trial
9
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court's decision.
address

The Court of Appeals therefore did not have to

in detail the numerous other equitable

issues which

supported the trial court decision.
The appellant correctly indicates that actual knowledge
would be an absolute bar to equitable subrogation. Badger Coal and
Lumber v. 01 sen, 167 P. 680 (Utah 1917)

In the case before the

court, the trial court never had to address the issue of whether
the bank (appellant's predecessor) had actual knowledge or only
constructive knowledge.

Defendant Youngman (the bank's client)

knew that Richards had started his painting work sometime before
June 29 and therefore she had actual knowledge.
documents were not signed until July 7.

Bank loan

The Court of Appeals

affirmed the trial court's decision which ruled both legally and
equitably in favor of the painter (appellee). Both courts gave the
appellant the benefit of the doubt that the bank may have had only
constructive notice rather than actual notice.
Appellant relies on George v. Butler, 50 P. 1032 (Utah
1897) which is also a highly fact sensitive case based on a
misidentification of a lot.

The parties were ultimately placed

into the equitably correct position based on actual facts.

The

case was decided on the issues of equity, not on the nature of
constructive or actual notice.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals chose to

<

consider constructive notice as a significant element (but not the
only element)

in balancing

equities.

The Court of Appeals

concludes that in this fact situation constructive notice was a
10
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i

sufficient basis to uphold the trial court's findings that the
equity factors favored the mechanic's lien holder.

Appellant

interprets the opinion as making a universal rule on "constructive
notice" rather than a rule applicable to this case.

Either way,

the opinion of the Court of Appeals would be correct.

However,

from reading the entire opinion, it appears that this ruling was
intended to be applicable to facts in this particular case.

The

Court of Appeals recognized that equitable subrogation cases must
be weighed upon all of the facts. This is apparent from statements
in the opinion that "[t]he nature of situations in which equitable
remedies are applicable are highly fact sensitive..." (Opinion, p.
9) and that "[t]he equitable nature of the doctrine prevents
articulation of an unwavering rule that applies in all cases."
(Opinion, p. 4)
The Court of Appeals used the constructive notice prong
as a sufficient basis to uphold the trial court's determination
that the doctrine of equitable subrogation was not applicable.
Having determined there was a sufficient basis, the Court of
Appeals did not need to address each of the equitable factors
favoring the lien holder.
A number of courts have concluded that constructive
notice under mechanicfs
equitable subrogation.

lien statutes defeats application of
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. First

Security Bank, 491 P.2d 1261 (Idaho 1971); but see Smith v. State
Savings & Loan Assoc, 223 Cal. Rptr. 298, 301, 175 Cal.App.3d
1091, 1099

(Cal.App. 1985)

The two Utah cases relied on by
11
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appellant, -Martin v. Hickenlooper. 59 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1936) and
George v. Butler, 50 P. 1032 (Utah 1897), allowed equitable relief
on

issues

other

than

constructive

notice.

They

determined

constructive notice was immaterial to the particular decisions.
The appellant seeks to create a negative interpretation from these
cases

that

constructive

notice

equitable subrogation cases.

should

not

be

considered

in

The fact that in those cases the

issue of constructive notice was not controlling does not negate it
as an important consideration.

The Court of Appeals readily

acknowledged that the very nature of equitable subrogation prevents
articulation or an unwaverable rule that would be universally
applicable*

The fact that in this case constructive notice was a

sufficient basis to uphold the trial court's decision does not
create an unwaverable rule in all cases. The very nature of equity
allows for "wavering" rules when justice so requires. Justice did
not require wavering the rules of law in this case.
Point II
Constructive Notice is Sufficient Notice
to Protect Mechanic's Lien Rights
In mechanic's lien cases the legislature has specifically
adopted the concept of "constructive notice" as controlling in
establishing a "relation back" date for determining the priority of
mechanic's liens over other encumbrances.

The Court of Appeals

<

held that "[t]he mechanics' lien statutes are an expression of
legislative intent that should stay the hand of equity in this
situation.

If we held otherwise, we would violate the equitable
12
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(

maxim that equity follows the law."

(Opinion, p. 8)

In finding

that appellee commenced visible work on the property prior to the
Ameristar refinancing, the court found that equitable subrogation
was not available in this situation.
Utah mechanic's lien cases recognize the importance of
constructive notice by requiring visible signs of construction so
that the "relation back" doctrine makes subsequently filed liens
effective as of the date of commencement of construction.

"From

the time the contractor begins to furnish materials, it is notice
to anyone thereafter contracting with the owner that the property
is burdened with a lien..."

Teahen v. Nelson, 6 Utah 363, 23 P.

764; First of Denver Mortgage

Investors v. C.N.

Zundel and

Associates, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979) There is clear legislative
intent to create a priority for a mechanic's lien claimant that is
established by constructive notice whether or not there is actual
notice.

Whether a primary mortgage or a judgment lien or a

conveyance has a priority over a mechanic's lien is generally
determined on the basis of "constructive notice."

Said liens are

generally not filed until after work is completed and the lien
claimant has not been timely paid.

Therefore, those seeking an

interest in the land must see what is there to be seen or be
considered constructively so informed.

It should be no different

for an entity that seeks to alter, increase, consolidate, or modify
existing encumbrances.

The legislative intent to give this

priority to mechanic's lien holders and expect equity to follow the
law should not be disturbed.
13
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SUMMARY
The

combination

of

equity

following

the

law,

the

statutory intent, and the constructive notice gives a right of
protection to mechanic's lien holders which should not be muddied.
The Supreme Court should let the legislative priority for lien
claimants and the rulings of the Court of Appeals stand. Otherwise
a Pandora's box could be opened of entities trying to leapfrog over
prior established secured parties to establish preferred positions.
The Court of Appeals ruling does not interfere with the application
of equitable relief in appropriate situations. Equity cases should
be decided on the equity facts at the trial court levels.

The

Supreme Court should decline appellee's request for certiorari.
DATED this

T

day of May 1993.
Respectfully submitted,

RALPH R. TATE, JR.
Attorney for Plaintiff
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